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Abstract
Performance Evaluation for Secure Internet Group Management Protocol and Group
Security Association Management Protocol
Lin Chen
Multicast distribution employs the model of many-to-many so that it is a more efficient way of
data delivery compared to traditional one-to-one unicast distribution, which can benefit many appli-
cations such as media streaming. However, the lack of security features in its nature makes multicast
technology much less popular in an open environment such as the Internet. Internet Service Providers
(ISPs) take advantage of IP multicast technology’s high efficiency of data delivery to provide Internet
Protocol Television (IPTV) to their users. But without the full control on their networks, ISPs can not
collect revenue for the services they provide. Secure Internet Group Management Protocol (SIGMP),
an extension of Internet Group Management Protocol (IGMP), and Group Security Association
Management Protocol (GSAM) have been proposed to enforce receiver access control at the network
level of IP multicast. In this thesis, we analyze operational detail and issues of both SIGMP and
GSAM. An examination of performance of both protocols is also conducted.
Keywords: IP Multicast security, Receiver access control, Secure IGMP, Group security association.
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IP multicast uses a one-to-many or many-to-many model for communication. A multicast packet
is only sent by the source once and it would be replicated on the nodes of the network and reach
multiple receivers. On the contrary, the other method of delivery: IP unicast employs the one-to-one
model. Although IP unicast is less efficient compared to IP multicast, it is more popularly used on
the Internet because of easier access control. Since a unicast packet will only reach one receiver and
it is specified by the sender, end-to-end encryption can be achieved. While a multicast packet is seen
as being sent away from the source and replicated on the way, the information of the receivers is
hidden from the sender so that the sender has no control on who will receive the packet.
For example, IPTV uses IP multicast to deliver television content to subscribers, in contrast to
traditional video streaming services that use IP unicast such as Youtube and Netflix. Although, IPTV
services have been used across the world and generate a large amount of revenue (Zion, 2016), due to
the fact that IP multicast has no built-in security feature, it is difficult to provide an IPTV service by
someone who does not have the full control of the network. In the case of IPTV service provided by
ISP, the multicast packets of the video stream are sent by servers controlled by them, replicated on
multicast router controlled by them and arrive to the Set-top Box (STB) provided before the content
of the video stream is shown on the TV. Because the ISPs control every waypoint of their IPTV
delivery, they are able to account for the amount of content watched by the users and collect revenue
from them.
Before the very first frame of video of IPTV is shown, several processes of communication must
2
be done over the network between the subscriber’s STB and the sources of video stream. Joining a
multicast group using IGMP is the first process.
SIGMP and GSAM (Li & Atwood, 2016) are two protocols under the architecture (Atwood,
2007) for multicasting to provide security features for IGMP and Multicast Listener Discovery
(MLD) by using Internet Protocol Security (IPsec) to protect their messages. SIGMP is an extension
to Internet Group Management Protocol Version 3 (IGMPv3) and MLD. GSAM is a key management
protocol for Group Security Associations (GSAs) used to protect SIGMP messages. Unlike IP unicast
places access control on that only the receivers with proper credential can understand the content of
the packet, SIGMP and GSAM take an alternative approach of controlling the interaction between
hosts and routers so that multicast packets will only reach the ones with proper credential.
However, the security features provided by SIGMP and GSAM introduces additional latency. In
this thesis, we present the operational details of the SIGMP and GSAM protocol bundle as well as its
performance evaluation on ns-3 network simulator. The rest of the thesis is organized as follows. For
Chapters 2, 3, 4, we introduce some background information of IGMP, IPsec and ns-3. Then we
demonstrate the operation details of SIGMP and GSAM in Chapter 5. The problem statement and
the objective are presented in Chapter 6. In Chapter 7, we illustrate our implementation of GSAM,
SIGMP and IPsec on ns-3 simulator. Furthermore, we compare the performance between the protocol




Internet Group Management Protocol
IGMPv1 (Deering, 1988), IGMPv2 (Fenner, 1997) and IGMPv3 (Kouvelas, Cain, Fenner,
Deering, & Thyagarajan, 2002) are currently the three versions of IGMP standardized by the Internet
Engineering Task Force (IETF). Like Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP), IGMP is an integral
part of Internet Protocol. It is required to be implemented by all hosts wishing to receive IP multicasts.
Although the three versions work differently, they are backward compatible. In this chapter, we
introduce all three versions of standard IGMP from the perspective of hosts, which means components
that do not concern the operation of hosts may not be covered in detail.
2.1 IGMPv1
IGMPv1 is the first IGMP protocol standardized by IETF, introduced along with many other
base notions of Host Extensions of IP Multicasting (Deering, 1988). There are only two types of
messages in IGMPv1: Host Membership Queries and Host Membership Report. Query messages are
sent by multicast routers to the local network and addressed to all-hosts group (address 224.0.0.1).
Hosts respond to a Query message by replying a report to IP address of the specific host group on the
network interface from which the query was received.
A single network interface of IGMPv1 host may transit among three possible states, with respect
to any single IP host group: Non-Member State, Delaying Member State and Idle Member State
respectively:
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(1) Non-Member State: When the host does not belong to the group on the interface. This is initial
state for all memberships on all network interfaces; it requires no storage in the host.
(2) Delaying Member State: When the host belongs to group on the interface and has a report
delay timer running for that membership.
(3) Idle Member State: When the host belongs to the group on the interface and does not have a
report delay timer running for that membership.








query received (start timer)
report received (stop timer)
timer expired (send report)
Idel Member
Non-Member
Figure 2.1: State Transistions in IGMPv1
Query messages are sent periodically by multicast routers. Report messages are generated when
changes of interface state occur on hosts. Both Queryand Report messages of concern to hosts have
time-to-live of 1 and share the exact format shown below in Table 2.1:
The Version field must be 1 for both IGMPv1 Query and Report messages. The Type field
indicates whether a message is a Query message or a Report message. It is set to 1 for Query
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Version (4-bit) Type (4-bit) Unused (8-bit) Checksum (16-bit)
Group Address (32-bit)
Table 2.1: The Format of IGMPv1 Messages
messages and set to 2 for Report messages. The Group Address field holds the host group address of
the group being reported and it is only valid in Report message. In Query messages, it should be set
to 0 when sent and ignored when received.
In order to avoid an implosion of concurrent Report messages and to reduce the total number of
Report messages transmitted hosts may not send reports immediately when receiving a Query and
suppress its own action of sending Report message when it receives a report to the host group it is
interested in from other hosts on the interface. To achieve the goal of avoiding report implosion, a
delay timer per group is used by hosts. When a host receives a Query message, the timer for each of
its group memberships is set to a random value between 0 and D seconds. (D is the maximum report
delay, a parameter of the IGMPv1 that can be configured). When a timer expired, a Report message
is generated for the corresponding host group. Report messages from other hosts causes hosts to stop
their own timers for the reported host group upon reception and not to generate their reports for that
group, with the result that only one report will be generated simultaneously on the network in the
normal case.
2.2 IGMPv2
IGMPv2 is the second IGMP protocol standardized by IETF, with some changes and additional
features. Firstly, a new type of message, Leave Group message, is added to IGMPv2, allowing
hosts explicitly to leave a host group by sending the message rather than just stop responding to
Membership Query message in IGMPv1. The group a host wishes to leave is specified by the
group address in the Leave Group message. Leave Group messages are sent to IP address 224.0.0.2.
Secondly, there are two kinds of Query messages in IGMPv2: General Query and Group-Specific
Query. Group-Specific Query messages are used to inquire about membership to one specific host
group on the attached network while General Query messages are for inquiring about membership in
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any host group. Group-Specific Query messages are sent to the IP address of the host group instead
of 224.0.0.2 in the case of General Query.
Furthermore, the role of a multicast router is divided into Querier and Non-Querier. A Querier
is a multicast router that handles Report messages and sends Query messages. ANon-Querier router
acts as a backup for a Querier router. It handles Report messages but does not send Query messages.
There can only be one Querier existing in a local network. An Querier election is performed when
there is more than one multicast router residing in the local network.
Hosts may belong to the same three kinds of states in IGMPv2 as they do in IGMPv1. However,
due to the new types of message, there are two new events that trigger state transition of a network
interface on a host in addition to five in IGMPv1. The following Figure 2.2 shows messages
generation and the transition of states of hosts in IGMPv2:
Delaying Member
query received (start timer)
report received (stop timer, clear flag)
















Figure 2.2: State Transistions in IGMPv2
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Moreover, the format of IGMPv2 messages is also changed stighly, as shown below in Table 2.2
Type (8-bit) Max Resp Time (8-bit) Checksum (16-bit)
Group Address (32-bit)
Table 2.2: The Format of IGMPv2 Messages
Firstly, IGMPv2 messages are very similar to IGMPv1 messages. Both are 8 octets in normal
cases. In the case of General Query, they are almost identical except that Query message in IGMPv2
has an additional Max Resp Time field defined in the unused part of IGMPv1 message. The field
specifies the maximum allowed time before sending a responding report in units of 1/10 second.
This waiting time is a part of techniques used for avoiding report implosion.
Secondly, the first 8− bit field of IGMPv2 packet is differently defined from IGMPv1. The first
4− bit Version field and the following 4− bit Type field of IGMPv1 is merged into the first single
8− bit Type field in IGMPv2 packets. In IGMPv2, there are four types of message: Membership
Query (Type 0x11), Version 2 Membership Report (Type 0x16), Leave Group (Type 0x17). As we can
see, IGMPv1 Membership Query message and IGMPv2 Membership Query message are identical.
Though, IGMPv1 Membership Report (Type 0x12 with respect to IGMPv2 packet format) will not
be issued by IGMPv2, it can be recognized by IGMPv2 as backwards-compatibility.
Finally, new defined Leave Group messages are sent to 224.0.0.2 and Group-Specific Query
messages are sent to the multicast address of the host group.
2.3 IGMPv3
IGMPv3 is the latest standardized version of the IGMP. It is very different from but also
compatible with the previous two versions of IGMP. Features and differences will be introduced
below.
The main added feature of IGMPv3 is the support of source filtering, giving a system the ability
to report interest of a host group in receiving packets only from or all but not from specific source
addresses, which is required to support Source-Specific Multicast. Source-Specific Multicast allows
a receiver to specify the sources of IP packets, in contrast to the model of Any-source multicast,
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where any host can transmit to an host group (Bhattacharyya, 2003).
IGMPv3 databases maintain three kinds of records: Socket State 2.3, Interface State 2.4 and
Reception State 2.5. Entries of Socket State and Interface State are used to record group memberships
on IGMPv3 system on hosts. Entries of Reception State are used by IGMPv3 system on multicast
routers for recording group memberships reported by hosts attached to the local networks.
An entry of Socket State is maintained for each socket and it conceptually consists of a set of
records of the following form:
Interface Multicast-address Filter-mode Source-list
Table 2.3: The Format of Socket State
An entry of Interface State is maintained for each interface and it conceptually consists of a set
of the following form:
Multicast-address Filter-mode Source-list
Table 2.4: The Format of Interface State
An entry of Reception State is maintained for each group per attached network and it conceptually
consists of a set of records of the following form:
Multicast-address Group Timer Filter-mode Source Records (source address, source timer)
Table 2.5: The Format of Reception State
IGMPv3 is backward-compatible to IGMPv1 and IGMPv2, through downgrading the version
of the protocol when IGMPv3 multicast routers receive messages of lower version protocol. The
backward-compatibility requires IGMPv3 multicast routers to have implementations of IGMPv1 and
IGMPv2.
Though IGMPv3 has only one main added feature and is backward-compatible to the previous
versions of the protocol, it is almost completely different under the hood. Firstly, Query messages
and Report messages have different formats, which are completely different from what they are in
IGMPv1 and IGMPv2. Secondly, systems on hosts maintain reception states per socket in addition
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to Interface State. Finally, multiple timers and counters are used in IGMPv3 for source-filtering,
compared with is only one timer in IGMPv1 and IGMPv2.
The following Table 2.6 shows the format of IGMPv3’s Query messages:
Type = 0x11 (8-bit) Max Resp Code (8-bit) Checksum (16-bit)
Group Address (32-bit)
Resv|S|QRV (8-bit) QQIC (8-bit) Number of Sources (N) (16-bit)
Source Address [1] (32-bit)




Source Address [N] (32-bit)
Table 2.6: The Format of IGMPv3’s Query Messages
IGMPv3 adds a third kind of Query message: Group-and-Source-Specific Query, in additional to
General Query and Group-Specific Query. A Group-and-Source-Specific Query message is also sent
to the IP address of the host group, as it is for Group-Specific Query messages. An IGMPv3 Query
message may have length larger than eight octets. The length of a message depends on how many
Source Addresses are presented. The first 8 octets of IGMPv3 Query messages are similar to those in
IGMPv2. The Type field for IGMPv3 Query is fixed to 0x11 as it is in IGMPv2.
The following Table 2.7 shows the format of IGMPv3’s Report messages:
Type = 0x22 (8-bit) Reserved (8-bit) Checksum (16-bit)
Reserved (16-bit) Number of Group Records (M) (16-bit)
Group Record [1] (variable length)




Group Record [N] (variable length)
Table 2.7: The Format of IGMPv3’s Report Messages
In IGMPv1 and IGMPv2, a host can only express its interest in membership for one group per
report. In IGMPv3, however, the change of Report’s format allows a host to express its interest in
multiple groups in one report. The destination IP address of Report messages is also changed to
10
244.0.0.22 instead of the IP address of host groups in previous two versions. The size of Report
message is also limited by MTU of the network. If the size of a single Report message exceeds the
limit because of too many Group Records, the host needs to split the Report message to be sent.
In IGMPv3 Report messages, only the first 4 octets resemble to Report messages in IGMPv1
and IGMPv2. Other than that, the Number of Group Records field and a vector of Group Records
are presented. The Number of Records field must agree with the number of Group Records in the
message.
The following Table 2.8 shows the format of IGMPv3’s Group Record substructure in Report
messages:
Record Type (8-bit) Aux Data Len (8-bit) Number of Sources (N) (16-bit)
Multicast Address (32-bit)
Source Address [1] (32-bit)




Source Address [N] (32-bit)
Auxiliary Data (variable length)
Table 2.8: The Format of IGMPv3’s Group Recrods
The fields in Group Records are specified in the following:
(1) Record Type: there are three categories of Group Record: Current-State Record, Filter-Mode-
Change Record, Source-List-Change Record respectively. Each category has two types of
Group Record so that there are six kinds of Group Record in total. Different types of Group
Record report not only the membership of a host group but also the source addresses the group
members wish to listen to due to source-filtering feature added in IGMPv3. All six kinds will
be introduced in detail later along with changes and maintenance of reception states of host
groups in IGMPv3 multicast routers.
(2) Aux Data Len: the length, in bytes, of Auxiliary Data presented after the vector of Source
Addresses. This field may contain 0.
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(3) Number of Sources: it indicates how many Source Addresses are presented in the Group
Record.
(4) Multicast Address: it contains the IP multicast address of the host group to which the Group
Record pertains.
(5) Source Address: the vector of Source Addresses lists IP unicast addresses of the sources of the
multicast data stream.
(6) Auxiliary Data: this field contains additional information related to the Group Record, for
future use. It is not defined in the IGMPv3 document and must be set to 0 when sent and
ignored when received.
As there is a size limit of one single Report message, when a single Group Record contains too
many source addresses that will not fit into the Report message, those source addresses need to be
split into different Group Records.
Query messages are sent by a special multicast router called the Querier. General Query
messages are periodically sent to request membership information from hosts in an attached network.
In addition, Group-Specific Query and Group-and-Source-Specific Query messages may be sent
when the router receives Filter-Mode-Change or Source-List-Change records based on how the router
state is changed.
Report messages, containing group records, are sent by hosts. When an invocation of IPMulti-
castListen API by applications changes the state of an Interface, a Source-List-Change Record or
Filter-Mode-Change Record is generated. When a host receives a Query messages, a Current-State
Record is generated. Group Records are carried in Report messages and may be retransmitted in later
reports to cover the possibility of reports being missed by multicast routers.
2.4 Security and Performance
Every IGMP message is directly attached to a IPv4 header and delivered to neighboring local
network in plaintext. Therefore, anyone attached to the local network can receive every IGMP
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message. Furthermore, the Querier will process all the Report messages it receives meaning that
anyone on the local network can join any group.
The process of joining a member group in IGMP is essential to IPTV process and it contributes
a certain amount of latency to Channel Zapping Time of IPTV. In commercial IPTV, the delay of
channel switching consists of three components (Manzato & da Fonseca, 2013) :
(1) Network Delay (including IGMP delay): usually shorter than 100-200ms
(2) Synchronization Delay: 500-2000ms
(3) Buffering Delay: 1-2s





IPsec (Seo & Kent, 2005) is a suite of protocols used to protect communications over IP network,
providing confidentiality, data integrity, access control, and data source authentication to IP datagrams.
An IPsec system usually consists of following components:
(1) Security Protocols (Protocols which protect the IP traffic)
(2) Key Management Protocols
(3) Databases
An IPsec system acts as a boundary that filters all IP packets. When passing the boundary, an IP
packet can be discarded, bypassed or be reprocessed according the rules stored in IPsec databases.
3.1 Security Protocols
Authentication Header (AH) (Kent, 2005a) and Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) (Kent,
2005b) are the two protocols. Both AH and ESP provide their security services by either wrapping
the payload of the IP packet or the entire IP packet, depending on which mode, Transport Mode or
Tunnel Mode, is used. In Transport Mode, only the payload of the IP packet is modified and protected.
In Tunnel Mode, the whole IP packet becomes the payload of the protect IPsec packet and a new
IP header is constructed for the packet. The methods of packet transformation of AH and ESP are
introduced below:
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The following tables 3.1, 3.2, 3.3 show how an IPv4 packet is modified before and after applying
AH in Transport Mode as well as in Tunnel Mode:
original IP header TCP Data
Table 3.1: Before Applying AH
original IP header AH TCP Data
<-mutable field processing-><-immutable fields->
<- authenticated except for mutable fields ->
Table 3.2: After Applying AH in Transport Mode
new IP header AH original IP header TCP Data
<-mutable field processing-><- immutable fields ->
<- authenticated except for mutable fields in new IP header ->
Table 3.3: After Applying AH in Tunnel Mode
The following tables 3.4, 3.5, 3.6 show how an IPv4 packet is modified before and after applying
ESP in Transport Mode as well as in Tunnel Mode:
original IP header TCP Data
Table 3.4: Before Applying ESP
original IP header ESP header TCP Data ESP trailer ESP ICV
<- encryption ->
<- integrity ->
Table 3.5: After Applying ESP in Transport Mode
new IP header ESP original IP header TCP Data ESP trailer ESP ICV
<- encryption ->
<- integrity ->
Table 3.6: After Applying ESP in Tunnel Mode
The following tables 3.7, 3.8 show the data structures of AH and ESP mentioned above:
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Next Header (8-bit) Payload Len (8-bit) RESERVED (16-bit)
Security Parameters Index (SPI) (32-bit)
Sequence Number Field (32-bit)
Integrity Check Value-ICV (variable length)
Table 3.7: The Format of AH
Security Parameters Index (SPI) (32-bit)
Sequence Number Field (32-bit)
Payload Data (variable length)
Padding (0-255 bytes)
Pad Length (8-bit) Next Header (8-bit)
Integrity Check Value-ICV (variable length)
Table 3.8: Top-Level Format of an ESP Packet
For the IPsec system to process an incoming AH or ESP packet, the field of Security Parameters
Index (SPI) is used along with other fields in the IP header of a packet to identify the Security
Association (SA) in the IPsec system.
3.2 Key Management Protocols
Internet Key Exchange (IKE), Internet Key Exchange Version 2 (IKEv2), Group Domain of
Interpretation (GDOI) and Group Key Management using IKEv2 (G-IKEv2) are a series of protocols
that are used create to and manage SA in an IPsec system. IKE and IKEv2 are used to create manage
unicast SA while GDOI and G-IKEv2 are used to create and manage GSA for protecting the multicast
traffic.
Take IKEv2 as an example, IKEv2 is used between two entities to negotiate and create one or
more pairs of unidirectional IPsec SA. The process of creating the first SA pair consists of two phases.
In phase one, IKEv2 creates a bidirectional IKE SA and establishes a secure and authenticated
channel for IKEv2 communication in phase two. In the second phase, the two entities negotiate what
encryption method and cryptographic keys to be used, what traffic to protect. The result of such
negotiation is a pair of unidirectional IPsec SAs created on both entities. In addition, more child SA
pairs can be negotiated afterward.
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3.3 Databases
There are three kinds of major conceptional databases in an IPsec system: The Security Policy
Database (SPD) for unicast or Group Security Policy Database (GSPD) for multicast, the Security
Association Database (SAD) and the Peer Authorization Database (PAD). These databases and their
interfaces allow system administrators to control the processing details of all inbound and outbound
IP traffic. IETF defines the general model for these databases, however, their implementations are
largely a local matter.
The SPD is an ordered database. It specifies the policies that determine the disposition of all IP
traffic bound or outbound from a host or security gateway. Each IPsec system must have at least
one SPD. The format of SPD entries depends on implementation. Each SPD entry specifies packet
disposition as BYPASS, DISCARD or PROTECT and it is keyed by one or more selectors such as
packet’s local address, remote address, next layer protocol number, etc. GSPD entries employ a
different structure of IP address selectors due to the fact the symmetric relationship associated with
local and remote address values is not enough. In an IPsec enabled system, SPD (or GSPD for
multicast) must be consulted during processing of all IP traffic.
SAD contains parameters that are associated with each established (keyed) SA. Each SA entry
defines the parameters to provide security service of either AH or ESP. For outbound processing,
each SAD entry is pointed by the SPD cache. For inbound processing, the SPI alone or in conjunction
with other fields in IP header is used to look up an SA.
PAD provides a link between an SA management protocol (such as IKE) and the SPD. It embodies
several critical functions:
(1) Identifies the peers or groups of peers that authorized to communicate with this IPsec entity
(2) Specifies the protocol and method used to authenticate each peer
(3) Provides the authentication data for each peer
(4) Constrains the types and value of IDs that can be asserted
(5) Constrains the types and values of IDs that can be asserted by a peer with regard to child SA
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creation, to ensure that the peer does not assert identities for lookup in the SPD that it is not
authorized to represent, when child SAs are created
(6) Peer gateway location info
For an outbound packet, SPD (or GSPD for multicast) is consulted for looking up a matched
policy entry. If no matched policy entry found or the matched match specifies the disposition of the
packet is DISCARD, the packet would not pass through the IPsec boundary and would be dropped. If
a matched policy is found and it states the disposition of the packet is BYPASS, the packet would pass
through the IPsec boundary without any additional processing. If a matched policy is found and it
states the disposition of the packet is PROTECT, a look up of SA entry would be performed using the
link to SPD contained in the policy entry. If a matched SA entry is found, transformation of the packet
would be performed and a AH or ESP header would be added to the packet. Otherwise, the packet
would either be dropped or a SA negotiation process would start depending on the implementation
and configuration of the IPsec system. For an inbound packet, the same processing of consulting with
SPD is performed. In the case where a matched policy entry is found and the policy entry specifies
the disposition of the packet is PROTECT, a look up of SA entry is performed using the SPI value
provided in the IPsec header alone or in conjunction with other information in the IP header. If a
matched SA is found and the packet is genuine, the IPsec header would be removed and the reverse




We choose ns-3 as our simulation platform. On its introduction webpage: “ns-3 is a discrete-event
network simulator, targeted primarily for research and educational use. ns-3 is free software, licensed
under the GNU GPLv2 license, and is publicly available for research, development, and use. The
goal of the ns-3 project is to develop a preferred, open simulation environment for networking
research: it should be aligned with the simulation needs of modern networking research and should
encourage community contribution, peer review, and validation of the software. The ns-3 project is
committed to building a solid simulation core that is well documented, easy to use and debug, and
that caters to the needs of the entire simulation workflow, from simulation configuration to trace
collection and analysis. Furthermore, the ns-3 software infrastructure encourages the development
of simulation models that are sufficiently realistic to allow ns-3 to be used as a real-time network
emulator, interconnected with the real world and that allows many existing real-world protocol
implementations to be reused within ns-3.” (Nsnam, 2015)
4.1 Programming Model
ns-3 employs the model of Object-oriented programming. Similar entities, processes and
functions are categorized into an ns-3 module. A module of ns-3 contains definition and declaration
of one or more C++ classes that compose a protocol in the network stack, abstraction of a physical
entity or a software component in a network system or a utility for simulation. For example, the
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UDP modules contains classes of UDP header, UDP protocol as well as data structures of UDP
sockets. There are three most frequently used classes of ns-3 infrastructure in this project: ns3::Ptr,
ns3::Object and ns3::Header. Firstly, ns3:Ptr is ns-3’s built-in smart point class, providing functions
of auto resource recycling and bounds checking. Secondly, objects of classes that inherit ns3::Object
class can be referred to by ns3::Ptr pointers. Thirdly, objects of classes that inherit ns3::Header class
can be easily aggregated to objects of ns3::Packet class using ns3::Packet::AddHeader() method.
4.2 Abstraction of a Host
As shown in Figure 4.1, in ns-3, a network host is modeled as an object of ns3::Node class.
Installing a network stack on a network host means aggregating various objects of classes representing




Figure 4.1: An Object of ns3::Node
4.3 Abstraction of IP Network Stack
As we can see from Figure 4.2, ns-3 has a well layered model of IPv4 communication. Each
compartment holds the name of a ns-3 built-in class that represents a component of network system of
an entity. Firstly, class ns3::Socket represents Socket of operating system. Class ns3::Ipv4L4Protocol
presents forth layer’s protocols in the network stack. For example, the built-in classes for TCP,
UDP and ICMPv4 are all subclasses of ns3::Ipv4L4Protocol. Class ns3::Ipv4L3Protocol and class
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ns3::Ipv4Interface represent Internet Protocol itself and the descriptor of interface in operating system
respectively. Furthermore, class ns3::NetDevice represents physical devices. Finally, network packets
or data-link frames are represented by class ns3::Packet. The physical link that packets transmit
through are modeled as class ns3::Channel. ns3::Socket, ns3::Ipv4L4Protocol and ns3::NetDevice


















SIGMP and GSAM is an approach (Li & Atwood, 2016), within the Secure Architecture (Atwood,
2007), to provide security service for IGMP/MLD messages so that revenue collection is possible.
The generation of the delivery tree of a multicast stream depends on information of multicast
group memberships in the IGMP/MLD database. The SIGMP and GSAM protocol bundle uses
IPsec to provide per group access control over IGMP/MLD messages without modifying any existing
protocol. A user with a proper credential for a given secure group can negotiate a GSA pair with Q .
Then a SIGMP Report message for that group protected by such GSA from the user can safely pass
through the IPsec boundary on Q , so that the user can successfully join the group. Although SIGMP
and GSAM can be applied to both IGMP and MLD , the rest of this chapter focuses on IGMP.
5.1 SIGMP
SIGMP is an extension based on IPsec for IGMPv2, IGMPv3 and MLD , offering the following
additional services:
(1) Compatibility: As an extension of IGMP, SIGMP employs identical packet format of regular
IGMP message so that it can communicate to entitles that do not have SIGMP support. SIGMP
also does not affect the operation of IGMP databases.
(2) Confidentiality: SIGMP messages are protected by an ESP header.
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(3) Authentication: Corresponding GSAs used by ESP is correlated with an application-level
credential by GSAM so that protected SIGMP messages are authenticated.
Identical to IGMP, there are three kinds of roles in SIGMP, Q , NQ and GM . Q and NQ are
multicast routers. As an IGMP extension, SIGMP enabled hosts should provide functionalities of
IGMPv1, IGMPv2 and IGMPv3. Every SIGMP message is an enveloped ESP message of IPsec
and protected by a pair of GSAs. This means performance overhead will be introduced because the
process of GSAM must be done before sending the SIGMP message. Therefore, an SIGMP enabled
host should not include membership of secure groups in any Report message for responding to a
General Query message. The differences between IGMPv3 Message and SIGMP Message are shown
in following Table 5.1
IGMPv3 SIGMP
GQ Sender Q Identical with IGMPv3
Receiver All EUs and NQs
Destination Address 244.0.0.1
GSA Sender Q Identical with IGMPv3
Receiver EUs that have joined the group and NQs
Destination Address IP Address of the Group
GSSQ Sender Q Identical with IGMPv3
Receiver EUs that have joined the group and NQs
Destination Address IP Address of the Group
Report Sender EU EU
Receiver Q and NQs Q and NQs
Destination Address 224.0.0.22 IP Address of the Group
Table 5.1: IGMPv3 Message vs SIGMP Message
5.2 GSAM
GSAM is a key management protocol to establish the parameters for the GSA s used by SIGMP
participants. The operation of GSAM is divided into two phases of message exchanges. Like IKEv2
(Kivinen, Hoffman, Kaufman, Nir, & Eronen, 2014), a message exchange in GSAM consists of a pair
of messages: a request and a response. Considering a message can be lost during the transmission,
retransmission of a request message might take place. One must reply with a response message upon
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receiving a request message. However, a response message should never be transmitted twice.
The first phase consists of two message exchanges:
(1) Init Exchange: The purpose of this exchange is negotiation of SPI values and cryptographic
keys. A single Init SA of GSAM is established on each endpoint by this exchange.
(2) Auth Exchange: Using the secure channel protected by the Init SAs, two endpoints further
negotiate other parameters and exchange id information. Additional to Init SA, an Auth SA of
GSAM is established on each endpoint by this exchange.
By the end of the first phase, an secure and authenticated channel for communication is established
between two participants, which can either be a Q and a GM or a Q and an NQ . The channel protected
by the Auth SA is used for communication in phase two.
The second phase consists of the following exchanges and messages:
(1) GSA Distribution Exchange: The Q distributes a pair of GSAs it generates to the GM that
is joining the group and all NQs through a GSA Push message. Whoever receives it should
respond a GSA with Ack message or SPI Rejection message if there is a SPI conflict.
(2) SPI Resolve Exchange: If there is a SPI conflict, Q will send a SPI Request message to the
GM and all NQs to gather their currently occupied SPI values. Whoever receives it should
respond with a SPI Report message containing their used SPI values.
(3) GSA Repush Message: After the SPI Resolve Exchange, the Q sends a GSA Repush message
containing a pair of GSAs with revised SPI values.
The purpose of phase two message exchanges is distribution of GSAs. Since the SPI values of
GSAs are solely determined by the Q, they might conflict with the ones being used on other hosts. A
pair of GSAs consists of a GSA Q and GSA R. GSA Qs is used to protect Query messages of SIGMP
and GSA Rs is used for Report messages. Therefore, a GSA Q may be rejected by a GM or an NQ
while a GSA R can only be rejected by an NQ.
In this thesis, the format of GSAM messages are very similar to IKEv2’s shown in Table 5.2.




Generic Payload Header (4-byte)
Payload Substructure (variable length)
Table 5.2: The Format of IKEv2 Messages
(1) The header of IKEv2 messages:
IKE SA Initiator’s SPI (64-bit)
IKE SA Responder’s SPI (64-bit)
Next Payload (8-bit) MjVer (4-bit) MnVer (4-bit) Exchange Type (8-bit) Flags (8-bit)
Message ID (32-bit)
Length (32-bit)
Table 5.3: The Format of IKEv2 Header
Fields IKE SA Initiator’s SPI and IKE SA Responder’s SPI specify the pair of SPI values
to be used to indentify a unique IKEv2/GSAM SA. The Initiator’s SPI is chosen by the
intiator of a certain phase of the process, for example, the GM during the first phase of GSAM
negotiation. Then, the Responder’s SPI is chosen by the responder. Because the messages
of IKEv2 and GSAM employ a chain-like structure of payloads, the field Next Payload is
used to indicate the type of payload that immediately follows the current data structure. In
the case of message header, it indicates the type of first payload of the message. MjVer is
major Version and MnVer is short for Minor Version. These two fields indicate the version of
the protocol. Exchange Type indicates the type of exchange being used. IKEv2 defines four
values for this field, shown in Table 5.4. In the case of GSAM, messages’ Exchange Type are
set to: IKE SA INIT in Init Exchange during phase one, IKE AUTH in Auth Exchange during
phase one, CREATE CHILD SA for GSA Push and INFORMATIONAL during the rest of the
period of the process. The field Flags specifies whether the message is from the initiator or
is a respose, as well as indicates that the transmitter is capable of speaking a higher major
version of the protocol. Message ID is the message identifier used to control retransmission of
lost packets and matching of requests and responses. Length indicates the length of the total
message including the header.
(2) The data structure Generic Payload Header:
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Exchange Type Value
IKE SA INIT 34
IKE AUTH 35
CREATE CHILD SA 36
INFORMATIONAL 37
Table 5.4: The Defined Values of Exchange Type
Next Payload (8-bit) Critical (1-bit) RESERVED (7-bit) Payload Length (16-bit)
Table 5.5: The Format of IKEv2 Generic Payload Header
The field Next Payload here has the indentical meaning as it is in the header of the message.
The Critical bit is set by the sender to let the recipient know whether it wants the payload
skipped if unrecognized.
(3) The data structure of the Security Association Payload Substructure. The Proposals also use a
chain-like structure as the payloads of the message do:
<Proposals >(variable length)
Table 5.6: The Format of IKEv2 Security Association Payload Substructure
(4) The data structure of the Proposal Substructure in Security Association Payload Substructure:
Last Substruc (8-bit) RESERVED (8-bit) Payload Length (16-bit)
Proposal Num (8-bit) Protocol ID (8-bit) SPI Size (8-bit) Num Transforms (8-bit)
SPI (variable length)
<Transforms >(variable length)
Table 5.7: The Format of IKEv2 Proposal Substructure
The Last Substruc field is set to 0 if this was the last Proposal Substructure, and a value of 2 if
there are more Proposal Substructures. The Protocol ID has three possible values, listed in
Table 5.8.
(5) The data structure of the Identification Payload Substructure:






Table 5.8: The Defined Values of Protocol ID
ID Type (8-bit) RESERVED (24-bit)
Identification Data (variable length)
Table 5.9: The Format of IKEv2 Identification Payload Substructure
Auth Method (8-bit) RESERVED (24-bit)
Authentication Data (variable length)
Table 5.10: The Format of IKEv2 Authentication Payload Substructure
(7) The data structure of the Nonce Payload Substructure:
Nonce Data (variable length)
Table 5.11: The Format of IKEv2 Nonce Payload Substructure
(8) The data structure of the Traffic Selector Payload Substructure:
Number of TSs (8-bit) RESERVED (24-bit)
<Traffic Selectors >(variable length)
Table 5.12: The Format of IKEv2 Traffic Selectors Payload Substructure
(9) The data structure of the Traffic Selector Substructure in Traffic Selector Payload Substructure:
TS Type (8-bit) IP Protocol ID (8-bit) Selector Length (16-bit)
Start Port (16-bit) End Port (16-bit)
Starting Address (variable length)
Ending Address (variable length)
Table 5.13: The Format of IKEv2 Traffic Selectors Substructure
Moreover, the following new data structures are defined for GSAM messages:
(1) The data structure of the Group Security Association Payload Substructure:
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GSA Push Id (32-bit)
<Source Traffic Selector >(variable length)
<Destination Traffic Selector >(variable length)
<Proposals >(variable length)
Table 5.14: The Format of GSAM Group Security Association Payload Substructure
GSA Push Id is used to indentify a specific phase two exchange because all phase two exchanges
between the Q and an NQ are protected by the same pair of GSAM SA.
(2) The data structure of the Group Proposal Substructure in Group Security Association Payload
Substructure:
0 (last) or 2 (not last) (8-bit) GSA Type (8-bit) Payload Length (16-bit)
Proposal Num (8-bit) Protocol ID (8-bit) SPI Size (8-bit) Num Transforms (8-bit)
SPI (variable length)
<Transforms >(variable length)
Table 5.15: The Format of GSAM Group Proposal Substructure
(3) The data structure of the Group Notify Payload Substructure:
Protocol ID (8-bit) SPI Size (8-bit) Notify Msg Type (8-bit) Number of SPIs (8-bit)
GSA Push Id (32-bit)
<Source Traffic Selector >(variable length)
<Destination Traffic Selector >(variable length)
<SPIs >(variable length)
Table 5.16: The Format of GSAM Group Notify Payload Substructure
5.3 Summary
In summary, the SIGMP and GSAM protocol bundle is an approach that provides security
features for IGMP/MLD. In addition to the provided security features, the protocol bundle also has
the following performance advantages:
(1) No modification to existing protocols: By using IPsec, the additional security features are
transparent to IGMP/MLD.
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(2) Integration: Although an extra key management protocol is introduced, no addition physical
entity is required for the operation of the protocol bundle because the roles in key management




The SIGMP and GSAM protocol bundle works within the secure IP multicast architecture to
enforce receiver access control, and more importantly to allow the generation of revenue. The
security of SIGMP and GSAM protocol bundle has been validated (Li & Atwood, 2016). However,
this security feature adds extra latency to the process of joining a group. Latency is one of the
factors of Quality of Experience (QoE). QoE affects a customer’s decision about purchasing a service.
Therefore, the performance of SIGMP and GSAM protocol bundle needs to be evaluated.
IGMP is one of the primary underlying protocols of IPTV service. IPTV is a very good
commercial use case to evaluate the performance of the protocol bundle because it is a paid service
and a user is sensitive to the time of channel changing. Changing channels in IPTV requires IGMP
to join multicast groups, which contributes a certain amount of latency to the total time of channel
changing.
The goals of this work are to analyze and evaluate the performance through simulation on ns-3
and to propose improvement based on analysis and results of simulation.
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Chapter 7
Implementation of SIGMP and GSAM
on ns-3
Although ns-3 provides a solid pack of infrastructure modules for simulation, it lacks implemen-
tation of IGMPv3 and IPsec. Therefore, modules of IGMPv3 and IPsec need to be developed prior to
implementation of SIGMP and GSAM. Although encryption and authentication is used to protect
SIGMP and GSAM messages, it is not vital in simulation. In this implementation, all messages are
transmitted in plain text. Moreover, we use a simplified AH instead of the required ESP for simplicity.
In this chapter, we will introduce the model of implementation of the protocol bundle on ns-3 with
Unified Modeling Language (UML). The implementation consists of the following five modules:
(1) IGMPv3 and SIGMP protocols module 7.2
(2) IGMPv3 data structures and databases module 7.3
(3) IPsec and GSAM databases module 7.4
(4) GSAM protocol module 7.5
(5) GSAM and simple AH data structures module 7.6
ns-3’s website provides a tutorial for using the simulator and a complementary wiki for related
contents including some How-to articles and links for development. However, the resource for
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developers is limited. In this thesis, we use the exisiting ns-3 modules , like ICMP, as examples for
developing our own modules. Moreover, to examine the correctness of our custom modules, we use
debugging tools to check intermediate outputs and log files for final outputs.
7.1 UML
UML (Unified Modeling Language, 2017) is a general-purpose, developmental, modeling lan-
guage in the field of software engineering, which is intended to provide a standard way to visualize
the design of a system.
In object oriented programming, UML class diagram (Class diagram, 2017) is a type of static
structure diagram that describes the structure of a system by showing the system’s classes, their
attributes, operations (or methods), and the relationships among objects.
In the diagram, classes are represented with boxes that contain three compartments:
(1) The top compartment contains the name of the class. It is printed in bold and centered, and the
first letter is capitalized.
(2) The middle compartment contains the attributes of the class. They are left-aligned and the first
letter is lowercase.
(3) The bottom compartment contains the operations the class can execute. They are also left-
aligned and the first letter is lowercase.








Figure 7.1: Notation of Lines and Arrows in UML
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In the rest of this chapter, for readability, we only show the top compartment of UML figures of
classes of the implementation. Full versions of those figures are included in Appendix A.
7.2 IGMPv3 and SIGMP Protocols Module
The module of IGMPv3 and SIGMP protocols shown in Figure 7.2 only has one class:
ns3::Igmpv3L4Protocol. It defines the operation of sending and receiving IGMPv3 as well as
SIGMP messages. Since SIGMP only provides functions of sending secure report to the group
address and not responding to general query, several extra class member methods are sufficient. The
class ns3::Igmpv3L4Protocol inherits the ns3::IpL4Protocol class so that objects of this class can be




Figure 7.2: Implementation of IGMPv3 and SIGMP Protocols
7.3 IGMPv3 Data Structures and Databases Module
This module can be divided into two parts. The first part consists of classes of IGMPv3 data
structures. The second part of the module includes the classes of IGMPv3 databases. There are
four classes, shown in Figure 7.3, in the first part of the module, which represent the corresponding
data structures: Query (Table 2.6), Report (section 2.7) and Group Record (Table 2.8) as well as the
header of messages in IGMPv3. All of them inherit ns3::Header class of ns-3 infrastructure so that







Figure 7.3: Implementation of IGMPv3 Data Structures
Figure 7.4 shows implementation of IGMPv3 databases in UML.
Firstly, each object of class ns3::IGMPv3InterfaceStateManager represents a per interface
database of IGMPv3’s Interface State. Each object of class ns3::IGMPv3SocketStateManager rep-
resents a per socket database of IGMPv3’s Socket State. An object of class ns3::Igmpv3Manager
on each IGMPv3 system provides the functionality of an access interface. Each objects of
class ns3::IGMPv3SocketState represents the multicast reception state (Table 2.3) for a specific
socket on a host. Each object of ns3::IGMPv3InterfaceState represents a per-interface multi-
cast reception state (Table 2.4) on a host. Objects of classes ns3::IGMPv3MaintenanceState and
ns3::IGMPv3MaintenanceSrcRecord represent the desired reception states (Table 2.5) for attached
networks by a multicast router. Secondly, these states and actions caused by changes of these states
are managed by ns3::IGMPv3InterfaceStateManager. These manager and state classes also contain
various timers defined in IGMPv3. Finally, all aforementioned classes inherit ns3::Object class so










Figure 7.4: Implementation of IGMPv3 Databases
7.4 IPsec and GSAM Databases Module
Figure 7.5 shows the implementation of IPsec and GSAM databases.
For IPsec, we implement three databases, SPD, SAD and PAD respectively. For simplicity, our
implementation of SAD also provides the functions of Group Security Association Database (GSAD).
Each network host has one object of ns3::IpSecDatabase class, one object of ns3::IpSecPolicyDatabase
class and multiple object of ns3::IpSecSADatabase class. The object of ns3::IpSecPolicyDatabase
represents the SPD on the system. The ones of ns3::IpSecSADatbase represent the SADs. While
the PAD is not modeled as an object of an independent class, its functions are integrated into the
object of ns3::IpSecDatabase. Furthermore, the object of ns3:IpSecDatabase also provides access
interfaces to the objects that represent the SPD and SADs. Objects of classes ns3::IpSecPolicyEntry
and ns3::IpSecSAEntry represents the entries of policies and security associations. Their formats are
shown in Table 7.1 and Table 7.2.
The functions of GSAM databases are provided by the object of ns3:IpSecDatabase. Ob-
jects of ns3::GsamInitSession class store information of init exchange of phase one. Objects of
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ns3::GsamSession store the information of auth exchange in phase one and message exchanges in
phase two. Several objects of ns3::GsamSession can be derived from one object of ns3::GsamInitSession
because the per group control takes place in auth exchange and message exchanges in the second
phase and we want to reuse the channels established in init exchanges in phase one. Each object
of ns3::GsamInitSession and ns3::GsamSession has one pair of objects of ns3::GsamSa storing
the SPI pair generated in init and auth exchanges and other relevant information. Objects of












Figure 7.5: Implementation of IPsec and GSAM Databases
range of source addresses range of destination addresses IP protocol number
bypass, discard or protect range of source ports range destination ports
IPsec mode link to incoming SAD link to outgoing SAD
Table 7.1: The Format of SPD Entries
direction of the packet SPI value encrption function
Table 7.2: The Format of SAD Entries
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7.5 GSAM Protocol Module
Figure 7.6 shows the implementation of this module. This module also has only one class
ns3::GsamL4Protocol, which defines the operation of message exchanges in GSAM. The class
ns3::GsamL4Protocol inherits ns3::Object but not ns3::IpL4Protocol because GSAM is an applica-
tion protocol and it uses UDP.
ns3::Object ns3::GsamL4Protocol
Figure 7.6: Implementation of GSAM Protocol
7.6 GSAM and Simple AH Data Structures Module
This module consists of classes of various data structures of GSAM packets as well as the data
structure of a simplified AH.
Figure 7.7 shows the implementation a simplified AH. The class ns3::SimpleAuthenticationHeader
also inherits ns-3 infrastructure class ns3::Header. An object of ns3::SimpleAuthenticationHeader




Figure 7.7: Implementation of Simple AH
Figure 7.8 shows the implementation of data structures of GSAM packets as well as IKEv2’s,
because GSAM reuses some of IKEv2’s data structures. A GSAM/IKEv2 packet consists of an
object of ns3::IkeHeader and an object of ns3::IkePayload. They can be directly aggregated into an
ns-3 packet since both of the classes inherit ns3::Header infrastructure class. Each ns3::IkePayload
object is composed by an ns3::IkePayload object and an object of ns3::IkePayloadSubstructure,
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which has several derived classes used for different message exchanges (sectiion 5.2):
(1) Objects of ns3::IkeSaPayloadSubstructure are used to carry the information of GSAM SA in
phase one of GSAM.
(2) Objects of ns3::IkeIdSubstructure are used to carry the identity information during the auth
exchange in phase one of GSAM.
(3) Objects of ns3::IkeAuthSubstructure are used to carry authentication information during auth
exchange in first phase of GSAM.
(4) Objects of ns3::IkeNonceSubstructure are used to carry a random number during the init
exchange in phase one of GSAM.
(5) Objects of ns3::IkeTrafficSelectorSubstructure are used to carry information of traffic selectors
in both phase of GSAM.
(6) Objects of ns3::IkeGsaPayloadSubstructure are used to carry the information of GSA during
the GSA Distribution in the second phase of GSAM.
(7) Objects of ns3::IkeGroupNotifySubstructure are used to carry the list of SPIs used on hosts in
the second phase of GSAM.
Moreover, the following data structures are also used:
(1) Objects of ns3::IkeSaProposal represent the SA Proposals attached to Security Association
Payloads.
(2) Objects of ns3::IkeGsaProposal represent the Group SA Proposals attached to Group Security
Association Payloads.
(3) Objects of ns3::IkeTrafficSelector are used to store infomation of traffic selectors in Traffic
Selector Payloads, Group Security Association Payloads and Group Notify Payloads.
Because of the similarity of format between Security Association Payload and Group Security As-
sociation Payload as well as between SA Proposal and GSA Proposal. ns3::IkeSaPayloadSubstructure



















Figure 7.8: Implementation of Data Structures of GSAM Packets
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Chapter 8
Analysis and Evaluation of Performance
8.1 Message Sequences in Different SPI Conflicts
There are three kinds of role in IGMP: Q, NQ and GM. A Q periodically sends General Query
messages and processes incoming Report messages from attached networks. There should always
be one Q in a network segment. NQs act as backups of the Q. An NQ also receives and processes
incoming Report messages but never sends any Query messages. A GM sends a Report message
when it wishes to join a group.
Moreover, the Q is also responsible for distributing GSA pairs and resolving SPI conflicts. To
join a secure group in SIGMP, a GM must do a series of message exchanges of GSAM with the Q
before sending the IGMP Report message.
We compare the process of joining an open group in IGMPv3 and the process of joining a secure
group in SIGMP. Though there can be multiple GMs and NQs, the scenario of the comparison is
set as the following: In a simple network segment, there are one Q, one NQ and two GMs. One
GM (GM1) performs a regular IGMPv3 join and the other one performs an SIGMP join. Moreover,
depending on the location of SPI conflict, there are five different cases of sequences of message
exchanges in our comparison:
(1) No SPI conflict takes place after GSA Distribution, shown in Figure 8.1
(2) SPI conflict from GM, shown in Figure 8.2
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(3) SPI conflict of only GSA R from NQs, shown in Figure 8.3
(4) SPI conflict of GSA Q or both from NQs, shown in Figure 8.4
(5) SPI conflict from both GM and NQs, shown in Figure 8.5












Figure 8.1: Packet Sequence When No SPI Conflict Happens
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Figure 8.2: Packet Sequence When GSA Q Is Rejected by the GM















GSA Repush GSA Repush
GM3
Figure 8.3: Packet Sequence When GSA R Is Rejected by NQs
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Figure 8.4: Packet Sequence When GSA Q or Both GSAs Are Rejected by NQs




















Figure 8.5: Packet Sequence When There Are SPI conflicts from both GM and NQs
There are five roles in these figures of our comparison:
(1) GM1 represents a host who wishes to join a secure group through SIGMP and GSAM.
(2) GM2 represents a host who wishes to join an open group through regular IGMPv3.
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(3) Q represents the Querier.
(4) NQ represents a Non-Querier.
(5) GM3 represents a group member who has already joined a group which GM1 is joining.
Assuming no packet loss and GM1 never joined any secure group, in all cases, the message
sequence for GM1’s joining starts with two pairs of phase one message exchanges, followed by phase
two exchanges, and ends with reception of GM1’s Report message by Q. GM2’s message sequence
starts with sending the IGMP Report message and ends when Q receives that message. Phase one
exchanges only involve Q and GM1. In all four cases of our comparison, message exchanges in phase
one between GM1 and Q always consists of a pair of Init messages and a pair of Auth messages. The
sending of Auth Response message marks the ending of phase one. The GSA Push messages sent
after it mark the beginning of phase two.
Phase two exchanges involve Q, GM1, NQ and GM3. Between Q and another participant, a GM
or a NQ, it starts with a pair of GSA Distribution messages. Particularly, in case one, the pair of
GSA Distribution messages consists of a GSA Push message and an GSA Ack message. In case two,
three, four and five, there will be three additional messages, which consist of a pair of SPI Resolve
messages and a GSA Repush message, if either GM1 or NQ rejects the GSA pair from Q because of
SPI conflict. In cases of SPI conflict, Q will initiate the SPI Resolve Exchange whenever it receives a
GSA Rejection message. However, Q will not generate a new resolved SPI for the GSA or send GSA
Repush message until it receives SPI Report messages from all members involved in the process.
Generally, GM1 sends the IGMP (SIGMP) Report to the network segment after finishing message
exchanges of GSAM. Specifically, in case one, GM1 sends the IGMP Report message following the
transmission of the GSA Ack message. In case two, three, four, the IGMP Report message is sent
when GM1 receives the GSA Repush message.
As to GM2, its group joining process remains identical in all four cases.
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8.2 Factors that Influence Performance
In the best-case scenario (case 1, shown in Figure 8.1), there is a total of seven messages during
the joining process, consisting of four first phase messages, two second phase messages between
GM1 and the Q, two second phase messages between the Q and NQ and one IGMP message. In the
worst-case scenario (case 4, shown in Figure 8.4 and case 5, shown in Figure 8.5), the combination
of messages is four first phase messages, five second phase messages between GM1 and the Q, five
second phase messages between the Q and NQ, three second phase messages between the Q and
GM3 and one IGMP message, which is eighteen messages in total.
In summary, when a host joins a secure multicast group in a network segment that has m NQs
and n GMs that have joined the same group, the minimal number of messages needed in the whole
process is seven and the maximal number is 10 + 5m+ 3n.
For performance evaluation, we measure the additional delay for joining a secure group using
SIGMP and GSAM. The additional delay consists of:
(1) Transmission time of messages, which can be affected by:
(a) The number of NQs
(b) The number of GMs that joined the group
(c) The probability of SPI conflict
(2) Transition time between two phases of GSAM and the one between SIGMP and GSAM
Firstly, transmission time of messages is affected by:
(1) The number of messages
(2) The speed and latency of the link
Secondly, since the Q is the ending point of phase one and the starting point of phase two, a
parameter in GSAM is needed to determine when phase two starts. Similarly, another parameter is
also needed for the transition between receiving GSA Repush message and sending IGMP Report.
We name these parameters:
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(1) TIME TRANSISTION P1P2
(2) TIME TRANSISTION ACKREPORT
8.3 Assumptions
While we model the boundary mechanism of IPsec, the duration of running encryption is not
implemented because ns-3 is an event driven simulator and it can not measure the how long a function
runs. Furthermore, studies (CALOMEL, 2017) (IoT Business Unit, ARM, 2015) show the duration
of running encryption is negligible compared to the factors we analyzed above. Additionally, we
make the following settings and assumptions:
(1) All hosts reside in a CSMA/CD ethernet segment with 100Mbps speed and 10ms latency,
which is reasonable to home environment.
(2) TIME TRANSISTION P1P2 and TIME TRANSISTION ACKREPORT is set to 0
(3) IGMPv3’s parameters are set to default values by IETF
(4) GMs periodically join a random group every second, which we assume it is large enough to
avoid congestion.
8.4 Initial Simulation
In ns-3, we run an initial simulation of comparing join time between IGMPv3 and SIGMP with
different probability of SPI conflict in following additional settings and assumptions:
(1) In the network segment, there are one Q, two NQs and 10 GMs.
(2) No IGMP packet loss: A GM may have to wait for a long general query interval for reporting
membership if loss of IGMP Report messages.
























Average Latency VS Rejection, Histogram
IGMPv3
GSAM_SIGMP
Figure 8.6: The Result of Initial Simulation
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As we can see from the result, the average delay of joining a group using IGMPv3 is low. And the
average latency when joining a secure group using SIGMP and GSAM is many times more no matter
what the rejection percentage is. Moreover, we can observe an abnormality here. The transmission
time of messages in SIGMP and GSAM should increase when there are more SPI conflicts. However,
the result shows the opposite trend.
After examining the log of packet transmission, we found the cause to this abnormality. Since
the Q would only install a GSA after receiving GSA Ack messages from everyone, if the IGMP
Report message reaches the Q before the GSA Ack message does, the IGMP Report message would
be discarded by the IPsec system. Then the Q has to wait for retransmission of the IGMP Report
message or a Report message in response to a General Query message. Either of them takes up to
several seconds.
8.5 Revision of Message Exchanges and its Result
We simply fix this issue by making the Q send an IGMP Group Specific Report message for the
secure group that GM1 is joining when it receives all the GSA Ack messages and finishes installing
the GSA. The revised message sequence of case 1 is shown in Figure 8.7:












IGMP GSQIGMP GSQ IGMP GSQ IGMP GSQ
Figure 8.7: Revised Packet Sequence When No SPI Conflict Happens
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Average Latency VS Rejection, Histogram
IGMPv3
GSAM_SIGMP
Figure 8.8: The Result after Revising Packet Sequence When No SPI Conflict Happens
As we can see from Figure 8.8, compared to the previous simulation, the average latency is greatly
improved in cases of low percentage of SPI Rejection, from seconds to hundreds of milliseconds.
However, it is still much higher than the one in IGMPv3.
8.6 Simulations with Different Numbers of NQs and GMs
After fixing the abnormality of the protocol, we continue the evaluation of the performance. As
we analyzed that the numbers of NQs and GMs also impact the number of messages to be exchanged
during the process of GSAM, we conduct two more experiment with different sets of numbers of
NQs and GMs.
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The Number of NQs
Average Latency VS Different Numbers of NQs, Histogram
IGMPv3
GSAM_SIGMP
Figure 8.9: The Result of Second Simulation
In the experiment, the number of GMs is set to 10, an the SPI Rejection Rate is set to 20%. The
rest of the parameters are identically set as they are in the initial simulation. As we can see from
Figure 8.9, the average latency of joining a group in SIGMP and GSAM protocols bundle drastically
increases as the number of NQs grows, specially when the number is larger than 4.

























The Number of GMs
Average Latency VS Different Numbers of GMs, Histogram
IGMPv3
GSAM_SIGMP
Figure 8.10: The First Result of Third Simulation
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In the experiment, the number of NQs is set to 2. The rest of the paraments remain unchanged.
As we can see from Figure 8.10. The average latency fluctuates as the number of GMs increases. We
can also observe that the latency of joining groups in IGMPv3 also greatly increased. Therefore, we
speculate it is caused by the congestion of the network. In above shown tests, each GM joins a group
every one second. We increase the interval between joining events to 10 seconds and the result is
























The Number of GMs
Average Latency VS Different Numbers of GMs, larger join-interval, Histogram
IGMPv3
GSAM_SIGMP
Figure 8.11: The Second Result of Third Simulation
As we can see from Figure 8.11, the average latency stays around 200ms to 400ms before the
network starts becoming overcrowd when the number of GMs is larger than 60.
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Chapter 9
Conclusion and Future Work
9.1 Conclusion
In this thesis, we analyze the performance of SIGMP and GSAM protocol bundle and compare
its latency of joining a group with the one of IGMPv3 by simulation in ns-3. In our analysis, we
present all possible cases of packet sequence and the factors that affect the performance. The first
simulation result shows SIGMP and GSAM protocol bundle has much inferior performance when
compared to IGMPv3. Moreover, the result also shows abnormal performance, which is that its
average latency decreases as SPI Rejection Rate increases.
Therefore, we analyze the log file of the first simulation and discover the cause of the issue.
Furthermore, we revise the packet sequence of a specific case of GSAM’s operation and conduct a
second simulation. The result of the revised approach of SIGMP and GSAM protocol bundle shows
the anticipated behavior from our performance analysis. Yet, its performance is still many times
worse than IGMPv3, an average latency of hundreds of milliseconds versus dozens of milliseconds
in IGMPv3.
Then, we conduct two more expriments with other two factors that influence the performance:
the number of NQs and the number of GMs. The results show that the average latency will become
very high when the number of NQs is large. When the network is not congested, the number of GMs
has very limited impact on the performance.
At last, taking video streaming as the use case, the latency of the IGMP process is relatively
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smaller compared to others such as video streaming buffering and synchronization, which can take
up to two seconds. For better revenue collection, we conclude from the results of our simulations that
when the number of NQs is small and the local network is not congested, the additional hundreds of
milliseconds latency is a reasonable overhead for the security and access control provided by SIGMP
and GSAM.
9.2 Future Work
Though the performance of the protocol bundle has been measured, there are details undefined
and space for improvement. Firstly, a secure but not authenticated channel established in Init
exchange of phase one between Q and NQ will be shared during joining processes of multiple groups
by multiple GMs. That is to say, the Q may issue simultaneous requests to NQ using a single Init
SA. Therefore, it requires a sliding-window mechanism for processing multiple incoming requests
and their retransmissions on the endpoint of NQs. Currently, in the simulation of this thesis, NQ
always treats incoming requests as new requests and increase its counters of message id accordingly.
Secondly, the issue of what content should be included in the SPI Report messages. To generate a
new SPI value whenever there is a SPI conflict, the Q needs to gather used SPI values from everyone
who is involved in joining process of the group by sending SPI Request messages. Whoever receives
such message should respond accordingly. In the current simulation, a host will enclose every SPI
valus used in its database. This is not efficient when the list of SPI values is large.
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Appendix A
Class Diagrams of the Implemention
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ns3::Igmpv3L4Protocol
+ PROT_NUMBER : const uint8_t
- m_node : Ptr< Node >
- m_downTarget : IpL4Protocol::DownTargetCallback
- m_GenQueAddress : Ipv4Address
- m_RptAddress : Ipv4Address
- m_role : ROLE
- m_event_robustness_retransmission : EventId
- m_gsam : Ptr< GsamL4Protocol >


























































Figure A.1: The Class Diagrams of IGMPv3 and SIGMP Protocols Implementation
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ns3::Igmpv3Query
- m_group_address : Ipv4Address
- m_resv_s_qrv : Resv_S_Qrv
- m_qqic : uint8_t
- m_num_srcs : uint16_t
- m_lst_src_addresses : std::list< Ipv4Address >
+ GetTypeId()
+ Igmpv3Query() «constructor»




















- m_reserved : uint16_t
- m_num_grp_record : uint16_t
- m_lst_grp_records : std::list< Igmpv3GrpRecord >
+ GetTypeId()
+ Igmpv3Report() «constructor»












- m_type : uint8_t
- m_max_resp_code : uint8_t
- m_checksum : uint16_t
- m_calcChecksum : bool
+ GetTypeId()
+ Igmpv3Header() «constructor»












- m_record_type : uint8_t
- m_aux_data_len : uint8_t
- m_num_srcs : uint16_t
- m_mul_address : Ipv4Address
- m_lst_src_addresses : std::list< Ipv4Address >































Figure A.2: The Class Diagrams of IGMPv3 Packet Data Structures Implementation
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ns3::Igmpv3Manager
- m_map_socketstate_managers : std::map< Ptr < Socket >, Ptr < IGMPv3SocketStateManager > >
- m_map_ifstate_managers : std::map< Ptr < Ipv4InterfaceMulticast >, Ptr < IGMPv3InterfaceStateManager > >
+ GetTypeId()
+ Igmpv3Manager() «constructor»








- m_interface : Ptr< Ipv4InterfaceMulticast >
- m_lst_interfacestates : std::list< Ptr < IGMPv3InterfaceState > >
- m_event_robustness_retransmission : EventId
- m_timer_gen_query : Timer
- m_lst_per_group_interface_timers : std::list< Ptr < PerGroupInterfaceTimer > >










































- m_socket : Ptr< Socket >
















- m_tid : TypeId
- m_disposed : bool
- m_initialized : bool
- m_aggregates : struct Aggregates*
- m_getObjectCount : uint32_t
+ GetTypeId()
+ Object() «constructor»



















Figure A.3: The Class Diagrams of IGMPv3 Databases Implementation Overview
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ns3::IGMPv3SocketStateManager
- m_socket : Ptr< Socket >
















- m_tid : TypeId
- m_disposed : bool
- m_initialized : bool
- m_aggregates : struct Aggregates*
- m_getObjectCount : uint32_t
+ GetTypeId()
+ Object() «constructor»




















- m_map_socketstate_managers : std::map< Ptr < Socket >, Ptr < IGMPv3SocketStateManager > >
- m_map_ifstate_managers : std::map< Ptr < Ipv4InterfaceMulticast >, Ptr < IGMPv3InterfaceStateManager > >
+ GetTypeId()
+ Igmpv3Manager() «constructor»
















- m_group_state : Ptr< IGMPv3MaintenanceState >
- m_source_address : Ipv4Address
- m_srcTimer : Timer
- m_uint_retransmission_state : uint8_t
+ GetTypeId()
+ IGMPv3MaintenanceSrcRecord() «constructor»

























+ operator Tester *() «constructor»
ns3::IGMPv3InterfaceStateManager
- m_interface : Ptr< Ipv4InterfaceMulticast >
- m_lst_interfacestates : std::list< Ptr < IGMPv3InterfaceState > >
- m_event_robustness_retransmission : EventId
- m_timer_gen_query : Timer
- m_lst_per_group_interface_timers : std::list< Ptr < PerGroupInterfaceTimer > >










































- m_manager : Ptr< IGMPv3InterfaceStateManager >
- m_multicast_address : Ipv4Address
- m_flag_secure_group : bool
- m_filter_mode : FILTER_MODE
- m_lst_source_list : std::list< Ipv4Address >
- m_lst_associated_socket_state : std::list< Ptr < IGMPv3SocketState > >
- m_old_if_state : Ptr< IGMPv3InterfaceState >
- m_que_pending_block_src_chg_records : std::queue< Igmpv3GrpRecord >
- m_que_pending_allow_src_chg_records : std::queue< Igmpv3GrpRecord >



































- m_tid : TypeId
- m_disposed : bool
- m_initialized : bool
- m_aggregates : struct Aggregates*
- m_getObjectCount : uint32_t
+ GetTypeId()
+ Object() «constructor»




















- m_manager : Ptr< IGMPv3InterfaceStateManager >
- m_multicast_address : Ipv4Address
- m_groupTimer : Timer
- m_filter_mode : FILTER_MODE
- m_lst_src_records : std::list< Ptr < IGMPv3MaintenanceSrcRecord > >
- m_uint_retransmission_state : uint8_t
- m_event_retranmission : EventId
+ GetTypeId()
+ IGMPv3MaintenanceState() «constructor»









































- m_group_address : Ipv4Address
- m_ptr_database : Ptr< IpSecDatabase >
- m_ptr_related_gsa_q : Ptr< IpSecSAEntry >
- m_lst_sessions : std::list< Ptr < GsamSession > >
- m_ptr_related_policy : Ptr< IpSecPolicyEntry >
+ GetTypeId()
+ GsamSessionGroup() «constructor»
























# m_current_message_id : uint32_t
# m_ptr_database : Ptr< IpSecDatabase >
# m_session_role : SESSION_ROLE
# m_timer_retransmit : Timer
# m_timer_timeout : Timer
# m_last_sent_packet : Ptr< Packet >
# m_number_retranmission : uint16_t
- m_peer_address : Ipv4Address
- m_ptr_init_sa : Ptr< GsamSa >
- m_ptr_first_join_session : Ptr< GsamSessio
+ GetTypeId()
+ GsamInitSession() «constructor»




































- m_tid : TypeId
- m_disposed : bool
- m_initialized : bool
- m_aggregates : struct Aggregates*
- m_getObjectCount : uint32_t
+ GetTypeId()
+ Object() «constructor»




















- m_ptr_init_session : Ptr< GsamInitSession >
- m_ptr_session_group : Ptr< GsamSessionGroup >
- m_group_address : Ipv4Address
- m_ptr_kek_sa : Ptr< GsamSa >
- m_ptr_related_gsa_r : Ptr< IpSecSAEntry >
- m_ptr_push_session : Ptr< GsaPushSession >
- m_set_ptr_push_sessions : std::set< Ptr < GsaPushSession > >
- m_ptr_igmp_interface : Ptr< Ipv4InterfaceMulticast >
+ GetTypeId()
+ GsamSession() «constructor»










































- m_type : SA_TYPE
- m_initiator_spi : uint64_t
- m_responder_spi : uint64_t
- m_ptr_init_session : Ptr< GsamInitSession >
- m_ptr_encrypt_fn : Ptr< EncryptionFunction >
+ GetTypeId()
+ GsamSa() «constructor»














- m_lst_ptr_all_sessions : std::list< Ptr < GsamSession > >
- m_lst_init_sessions : std::list< Ptr < GsamInitSession > >
- m_lst_ptr_session_groups : std::list< Ptr < GsamSessionGroup > >
- m_set_ptr_gsa_push_sessions : std::set< Ptr < GsaPushSession > >
- m_window_size : uint32_t
- m_ptr_spd : Ptr< IpSecPolicyDatabase >
- m_ptr_sad : Ptr< IpSecSADatabase >
- m_ptr_info : Ptr< GsamInfo >
- m_ptr_gsam : Ptr< GsamL4Protocol >
+ GetTypeId()
+ IpSecDatabase() «constructor»


































Figure A.6: The Class Diagrams of GSAM Database Implementation
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ns3::IpSecSADatabase
- m_direction : DIRECTION
- m_ptr_root_database : Ptr< IpSecDatabase >
- m_ptr_policy_entry : Ptr< IpSecPolicyEntry >
- m_lst_entries : std::list< Ptr < IpSecSAEntry > >
+ GetTypeId()
+ IpSecSADatabase() «constructor»
















- m_lst_ptr_all_sessions : std::list< Ptr < GsamSession > >
- m_lst_init_sessions : std::list< Ptr < GsamInitSession > >
- m_lst_ptr_session_groups : std::list< Ptr < GsamSessionGroup > >
- m_set_ptr_gsa_push_sessions : std::set< Ptr < GsaPushSession > >
- m_window_size : uint32_t
- m_ptr_spd : Ptr< IpSecPolicyDatabase >
- m_ptr_sad : Ptr< IpSecSADatabase >
- m_ptr_info : Ptr< GsamInfo >
- m_ptr_gsam : Ptr< GsamL4Protocol >
+ GetTypeId()
+ IpSecDatabase() «constructor»



































- m_ptr_root_database : Ptr< IpSecDatabase >
- m_lst_entries : std::list< Ptr < IpSecPolicyEntry > >
+ GetTypeId()
+ IpSecPolicyDatabase() «constructor»















- m_tid : TypeId
- m_disposed : bool
- m_initialized : bool
- m_aggregates : struct Aggregates*
- m_getObjectCount : uint32_t
+ GetTypeId()
+ Object() «constructor»



















Figure A.7: The Class Diagrams of IPsec Databases Implementation Overview
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ns3::IpSecDatabase
- m_lst_ptr_all_sessions : std::list< Ptr < GsamSession > >
- m_lst_init_sessions : std::list< Ptr < GsamInitSession > >
- m_lst_ptr_session_groups : std::list< Ptr < GsamSessionGroup > >
- m_set_ptr_gsa_push_sessions : std::set< Ptr < GsaPushSession > >
- m_window_size : uint32_t
- m_ptr_spd : Ptr< IpSecPolicyDatabase >
- m_ptr_sad : Ptr< IpSecSADatabase >
- m_ptr_info : Ptr< GsamInfo >
- m_ptr_gsam : Ptr< GsamL4Protocol >
+ GetTypeId()
+ IpSecDatabase() «constructor»



































- m_src_starting_address : Ipv4Address
- m_src_ending_address : Ipv4Address
- m_dest_starting_address : Ipv4Address
- m_dest_ending_address : Ipv4Address
- m_ip_protocol_num : uint8_t
- m_ipsec_mode : ns3::IpSec::MODE
- m_src_transport_protocol_starting_num : uint16_t
- m_src_transport_protocol_ending_num : uint16_t
- m_dest_transport_protocol_starting_num : uint16_t
- m_dest_transport_protocol_ending_num : uint16_t
- m_process_choise : ns3::IpSec::PROCESS_CHOICE
- m_ptr_spd : Ptr< IpSecPolicyDatabase >
- m_ptr_outbound_sad : Ptr< IpSecSADatabase >
- m_ptr_inbound_sad : Ptr< IpSecSADatabase >
+ GetTypeId()
+ IpSecPolicyEntry() «constructor»







































- m_direction : DIRECTION
- m_ptr_root_database : Ptr< IpSecDatabase >
- m_ptr_policy_entry : Ptr< IpSecPolicyEntry >
- m_lst_entries : std::list< Ptr < IpSecSAEntry > >
+ GetTypeId()
+ IpSecSADatabase() «constructor»
















- m_tid : TypeId
- m_disposed : bool
- m_initialized : bool
- m_aggregates : struct Aggregates*
- m_getObjectCount : uint32_t
+ GetTypeId()
+ Object() «constructor»



















Figure A.8: The Class Diagrams of SPD Implementation
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ns3::Object
- m_tid : TypeId
- m_disposed : bool
- m_initialized : bool
- m_aggregates : struct Aggregates*
- m_getObjectCount : uint32_t
+ GetTypeId()
+ Object() «constructor»




















- m_direction : DIRECTION
- m_spi : uint32_t
- m_ptr_encrypt_fn : Ptr< EncryptionFunction 
- m_ptr_sad : Ptr< IpSecSADatabase >
- m_ptr_policy : Ptr< IpSecPolicyEntry >
+ GetTypeId()
+ IpSecSAEntry() «constructor»














- m_direction : DIRECTION
- m_ptr_root_database : Ptr< IpSecDatabase >
- m_ptr_policy_entry : Ptr< IpSecPolicyEntry >
- m_lst_entries : std::list< Ptr < IpSecSAEntry > >
+ GetTypeId()
+ IpSecSADatabase() «constructor»















Figure A.9: The Class Diagrams of SAD Implementation
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ns3::Object
- m_tid : TypeId
- m_disposed : bool
- m_initialized : bool
- m_aggregates : struct Aggregates*
- m_getObjectCount : uint32_t
+ GetTypeId()
+ Object() «constructor»




















+ PROT_NUMBER : const uint16_t
- m_node : Ptr< Node >
- m_socket : Ptr< Socket >
- m_ptr_database : Ptr< IpSecDatabase >
- m_ptr_gsam_filter : Ptr< GsamFilter >
+ GetTypeId()
+ GsamL4Protocol() «constructor»










































































Figure A.10: The Class Diagrams of GSAM Protocol Implementation
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ns3::SimpleAuthenticationHeader
- m_next_header : uint8_t
- m_payload_len : uint8_t
- m_spi : uint32_t


















# m_length : uint16_t
+ GetTypeId()
+ IkePayloadSubstructure() «constructor»










- m_next_payload : PAYLOAD_TYPE
- m_flag_critical : bool
- m_payload_length : uint16_t
+ GetTypeId()
+ IkePayloadHeader() «constructor»















- m_tid : TypeId
- m_disposed : bool
- m_initialized : bool
- m_aggregates : struct Aggregates*
- m_getObjectCount : uint32_t
+ GetTypeId()
+ Object() «constructor»




















- m_initiator_spi : uint64_t
- m_responder_spi : uint64_t
- m_next_payload : IkePayloadHeader::PAYLOAD_TYPE
- m_version : Version
- m_exchange_type : EXCHANGE_TYPE
- m_flag_response : bool
- m_flag_version : bool
- m_flag_initiator : bool
- m_message_id : uint32_t
- m_length : uint32_t
+ GetTypeId()
+ IkeHeader() «constructor»



























- m_header : IkePayloadHeader
- m_ptr_substructure : Ptr< IkePayloadSubstructure >
+ GetTypeId()
+ IkePayload() «constructor»



















# m_length : uint16_t
+ GetTypeId()
+ IkePayloadSubstructure() «constructor»










- m_id_type : uint8_t
- m_flag_initiator_responder : bool
- m_lst_id_data : std::list< uint8_t >
+ GetTypeId()
+ IkeIdSubstructure() «constructor»













# m_lst_proposal : std::list< Ptr < IkeSaProposal > >
+ GetTypeId()
+ IkeSaPayloadSubstructure() «constructor»

















- m_flag_repush : bool
- m_gsa_push_id : uint32_t
- m_src_ts : IkeTrafficSelector
- m_dest_ts : IkeTrafficSelector
+ GetTypeId()
+ IkeGsaPayloadSubstructure() «constructor»
















- m_protocol_id : uint8_t
- m_spi_size : uint8_t
- m_notify_message_type : uint8_t
- m_num_spis : uint8_t
- m_gsa_push_id : uint32_t
- m_ts_src : IkeTrafficSelector
- m_ts_dest : IkeTrafficSelector
- m_set_u32_spis : std::set< uint32_t >
+ GetTypeId()
+ IkeGroupNotifySubstructure() «constructor»


























- m_num_of_tss : uint8_t
- m_flag_initiator_responder : bool
- m_lst_traffic_selectors : std::list< IkeTrafficSelector >
+ GetTypeId()
+ IkeTrafficSelectorSubstructure() «constructor»















- m_lst_nonce_data : std::list< uint8_t >
+ GetTypeId()
+ IkeNonceSubstructure() «constructor»












- m_auth_method : uint8_t













Figure A.13: The Class Diagrams of IKEv2 and GSAM Packet Payload Substructures Implementation
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ns3::IkeGsaPayloadSubstructure
- m_flag_repush : bool
- m_gsa_push_id : uint32_t
- m_src_ts : IkeTrafficSelector
- m_dest_ts : IkeTrafficSelector
+ GetTypeId()
+ IkeGsaPayloadSubstructure() «constructor»
















- m_gsa_type : GSA_TYPE
+ GetTypeId()
+ IkeGsaProposal() «constructor»














# m_lst_proposal : std::list< Ptr < IkeSaProposal > >
+ GetTypeId()
+ IkeSaPayloadSubstructure() «constructor»

















# m_flag_last : bool
# m_proposal_length : uint16_t
# m_proposal_num : uint8_t
# m_protocol_id : uint8_t
# m_ptr_spi : Ptr< Spi >
# m_spi_size : uint8_t
# m_num_transforms : uint8_t
# m_lst_transforms : std::list< IkeTransformSubStructure >
+ GetTypeId()
+ IkeSaProposal() «constructor»




















Figure A.14: The Class Diagrams of SA and GSA Payloads Substructures Implementation
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